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ABSTRACT
We demonstrate that unmodified commercial Flash memory can provide three
important security functions: true random number generation, digital finger-
printing and information hiding. Use of random telegraph noise (a type of
quantum noise source in highly scaled Flash memory cells) enables high qual-
ity true random number generation at a rate up to 10Kbits / second. A scheme
based on partial programming exploits process variation in threshold voltages
to allow quick generation of unique fingerprints that can be used for identifica-
tion and authentication. Aging-induced biases can hide data within the analog
characteristic of Flash as the program time of individual bits. Because the tech-
nique uses inherent behavior, normal Flash memory operations are not affected
and hidden information is invisible in the data stored in the memory. Even if an
attacker checks a Flash chip’s analog characteristics, experimental results indi-
cate that the hidden information is difficult to distinguish from inherent man-
ufacturing variation or normal wear on the device. Moreover, the hidden data
can survive erasure of the Flash memory data. All schemes require no change
to Flash chips or interfaces, and do not require additional hardware.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Flash memory has gained a ubiquitous place in the computing landscape today.
Virtually all mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets rely on Flash mem-
ory as their non-volatile storage. Flash memory is also moving into laptop and
desktop computers, intending to replace the mechanical hard drive. Floating-
gate non-volatile memory is even more broadly used in electronic applications
with a small amount of non-volatile memory. For example, even 8-bit or 16-
bit microcontrollers for embedded systems commonly have on-chip EEPROMs
to store instructions and data. Many people also carry Flash memory as stan-
dalone storage medium as in USB memory sticks and SD cards.
We propose to utilize analog behaviors of off-the-shelf Flash memory to en-
able hardware-based security functions in a wide range of electronic devices
without requiring custom hardware. More specifically, we show that a stan-
dard Flash memory interface can be used to generate true random numbers
from quantum and thermal noises and to produce device fingerprints based on
manufacturing variations. This thesis also introduces a technique to hide infor-
mation in analog characteristics of Flash memory in a way that the hidden bits
are not visible at all from the viewpoint of normal Flash memory content. Our
technique encodes a hidden bit in the program time of a group of Flash cells; a
fast program time encodes bit ’1’ and a slow program time encodes bit ’0’. We
found that writing 0 into a Flash cell incurs more stress on the cell than writing
1, which in turn results in a larger decrease in the program time of the corre-
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sponding cell. While the program time of individual cells cannot be accurately
controlled, our experiments demonstrate that bits can be reliably encoded in
the program time using many cells collectively. The techniques can be applied
to any floating-gate non-volatile memory in general, and does not require any
hardware modifications to todays Flash memory chips, allowing them to be
widely deployed.
1.2 Quantum Random Number Generation
Hardware random number generators (RNGs) provides important foundations
in building secure systems. For example, true randomness is a critical ingredient
in many cryptographic primitives and security protocols; random numbers are
often required to generate secret keys or prevent replays in communications.
While pseudo-random number generators are often used in todays systems,
they cannot provide true randomness if a seed is reused or predictable. As an
example, a recent study showed that reuse of virtual machine (VM) snapshots
can break the Transport Level Security (TLS) protocol due to predictable ran-
dom numbers [1]. Given the importance of a good source of randomness, high
security systems typically rely on hardware RNGs. Instead of requiring custom
hardware modules for RNGs, we found that analog noise in Flash memory bits
can be used to reliably generate true random numbers. An interesting finding
is that the standard Flash chip interface can be used to put a memory bit in
partially programmed state so that the internal noise can be observed through
the digital interface. There exist two sources of true randomness in Flash bits,
Random Telegraph Noise (RTN) and thermal noise. While both sources can be
leveraged for RNGs, our scheme focuses on RTN, which is quantum noise. Un-
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like thermal noise, which can be reduced significantly at extremely low temper-
atures, RTN behavior continues at all temperature ranges. Moreover, the quan-
tum uncertainty nature of RTN provides a better entropy source than system
level noises which rely on the difficulty of modeling complex yet deterministic
systems. Our algorithm automatically selects bits with RTN behavior and con-
verts RTN into random binary bits. Experimental results demonstrate that the
RTN behavior exists in Flash memory and can be converted into random num-
bers through the standard Flash interface. The Flash-based RNG is tested using
the NIST test suite [2] and is shown to pass all tests successfully. Moreover, we
found that the RNG works even at a very low temperature (-80 C). In fact, the
RTN behavior is more visible at low temperatures. On our test platform, the
Flash RNG generates about 1K to 10K bits per second. Overall, the experiments
show that true random numbers can be generated reliably from off-the-shelf
Flash memory chips without requiring custom circuits.
1.3 Device Fingerprint
In addition to generating true random numbers, we also found that the standard
Flash interface can be used to extract fingerprints (or signatures) that are unique
for each Flash chip. For this purpose, our technique exploits inherent random
variations during Flash manufacturing processes. More specifically, we show
that the distributions of transistor threshold voltages can be measured through
the standard Flash interface using incremental partial programming. Experi-
mental results show that these threshold voltage distributions can be used as
fingerprints, as they are significantly different from chip to chip, or even from
location to location within a chip. The distributions also stay relatively stable
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across temperature ranges and over time. Thanks to the large number of bits
(often several gigabits) in modern Flash chips, this technique can generate a
large number of independent fingerprints from each chip.
The Flash fingerprints provide an attractive way to identify and/or authen-
ticate hardware devices and generate device-specific keys, especially when no
cryptographic module is available or a large number of independent keys are
desired. For example, at a hardware component level, the fingerprints can be
used to distinguish genuine parts from counterfeit components without requir-
ing cryptography to be added to each component. The fingerprinting technique
can also be used for other authentication applications such as turning a Flash
device into a two-factor authentication token, or identifying individual nodes
in sensor networks.
While the notion of exploiting manufacturing process variations to generate
silicon device fingerprints and secret keys is not new and has been extensively
studied under the name of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [3], the Flash-
based technique in this paper represents a unique contribution in terms of its
practical applicability. Similar to true RNGs, most PUF designs require cus-
tom circuits to convert unique analog characteristics into digital bits. On the
other hand, our technique can be applied to off-the-shelf Flash without hard-
ware changes. Researchers have recently proposed techniques to exploit ex-
isting bi-stable storage elements such as SRAMs [4] or Flash cells [5] to gen-
erate device fingerprints. Unfortunately, obtaining fingerprints from bi-stable
elements requires a power cycle (power off and power on) of a device for ev-
ery fingerprint generation. The previous approach to fingerprinting Flash only
works for a certain types of Flash chips and takes long time (100 seconds for one
4
fingerprint) because it relies on rare errors called program disturbs. As an ex-
ample, we did not see any program disturbs in SLC Flash chips that we used in
experiments. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed device fingerprinting
techniques is the first that is fast (less than 1 second for a 1024-bit fingerprint)
and widely applicable without interfering with normal operation or requiring
custom hardware.
1.4 Information Hiding
This part introduces a technique to hide information in analog characteristics
of Flash memory in a way that the hidden bits are not visible at all from the
viewpoint of normal Flash memory content. More specifically, our technique
encodes a hidden bit in the program time of a group of Flash cells; a fast pro-
gram time encodes bit ’1’ and a slow program time encodes bit ’0’. We found
that writing 0 into a Flash cell incurs more stress on the cell than writing 1, which
in turn results in a larger decrease in the program time of the corresponding cell.
While the program time of individual cells cannot be accurately controlled, our
experiments demonstrate that bits can be reliably encoded in the program time
using many cells collectively.
While a number of steganography techniques have been developed previ-
ously [6, 7, 8], our Flash-based technique provides unique benefits compared to
typical digital steganography schemes where information is hidden in another
form of digital content such as images and documents. In particular, the hidden
information in Flash memory is decoupled from the Flash memory content and
instead tied to the physical object. The following summarizes the main benefits
5
of our scheme compared to digital steganography.
• Covert: The proposed technique does not change normal Flash operations
or content at all. As a result, inspecting the Flash memory content does
not reveal any hidden information. All Flash memory operations can still
be performed without any change, even with hidden information. In fact,
our experimental results suggest that even analog characteristics of Flash
memory such as page program/erase time do not change noticeably.
• Erase tolerant: The hidden information in Flash memory remains intact
even if the entire Flash memory is erased and programmed with new con-
tent. In fact, our experiments show that the hidden information can sur-
vive even hundreds of program/erase operations.
• Copy tolerant: In typical digital steganography, the cover text with hidden
information can be easily copied and stored so that it can be analyzed over
time. The hidden information in our technique, however, is tied to phys-
ical Flash memory and can only be accessed by measuring the program
time of individual memory cells while the Flash memory is in one’s pos-
session. Because modern Flash memory chips often contain tens or hun-
dreds of billions of memory cells, fully characterizing a Flash chip without
knowing the location of hidden bits is quite time consuming.
In a sense, the proposed information hiding technique is similar to physical
steganography methods where information is hidden in physical objects. For
example, people have used secret inks to write messages on blank parts of other
messages [9]. However, the proposed technique provides a couple of key bene-
fits over traditional physical steganography methods thanks to being electrical.
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• No hardware modification: The proposed technique works on unmodi-
fied Flash chips using the standard interface. In fact, the technique can be
implemented as a software program as long as a low-level Flash interface
is exposed.
• High capacity: Thanks to the high capacity of Flash memory, our tech-
nique provides a fairly high capacity compared to traditional physical
steganography techniques. For example, even if we hide one bit for every
512 Flash cells, a 8GB Flash chip can contain 16MB of hidden information.
Given the ubiquity of Flash memory and the easy applicability of the pro-
posed scheme on commercial Flash chips, we believe that the technique can en-
able a number of interesting applications. An obvious application of the infor-
mation hiding in Flash is a secure and covert storage of data [10]. For example,
a user can hide sensitive information in the Flash memory of a smartphone with
confidence that others cannot retrieve the information even when the phone is
lost or stolen. Information hiding provides an additional layer of protection
on top of typical encryption by preventing an adversary from reading or even
copying the ciphertext.
On the other hand, the capability to covertly communicate may be misused
to bypass legitimate access control policies. For example, in the business world,
the hidden information in Flash may be misused to export trade secrets. In this
sense, this study points out the potential danger.
Another traditional application of information hiding is watermarking [11].
In particular, given that the hidden information is tied to a physical Flash mem-
ory chip, the proposed technique can be used to embed watermarking in devices
with Flash memory. For example, mobile or embedded devices may be water-
7
marked to help retrieve them when lost or stolen. Similarly, the watermarks can
be used to distinguish genuine devices from low-quality counterfeits.
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CHAPTER 2
FLASH MEMORY BACKGROUND
This section provides background material on Flash memory and its oper-
ating principles to aid understanding of our Flash-based information hiding
scheme.
2.1 Floating Gate Transistors
Flash memory is composed of arrays of floating-gate transistors. A floating-gate
transistor is a transistor with two gates, stacked on top of each other. One gate
is electrically insulated (floating). Figure 2.1 shows an example of a floating-
gate device. The control gate is on top. An insulated conductor, surrounded by
oxide, is between the control gate and the channel. This conductor is the floating
gate. Information is stored as the presence or absence of trapped charge on the
floating gate. The trapped negative charge reduces the current flowing through
the channel when the N-type MOS transistor is on. This current difference is
sensed and translated into the appropriate binary value.
Flash cells without charge on their floating-gate allow full current flow in
the channel and hence are read as a binary “1”. The presence of charge on
the floating-gate will discourage the presence of current in the channel, making
the cell store a “0”. Effectively, the charge on the floating-gate increases the
threshold voltage (Vth) of a transistor. Single-level cells (SLC) store one bit of
information per cell by using two threshold voltage levels. Multi-level cells
(MLC) store more than one bit by more finely dividing the threshold voltage
levels: for example, four levels can be used to store two bits per cell.
9
Figure 2.1: Flash memory cell based on a floating gate transistor.
2.2 Flash Organization and Operation
At a high-level, Flash memory provides three major operations: read, erase,
and program (write). In order to read a bit in a Flash cell, the corresponding
transistor is turned on and the amount of current is detected. A write to a Flash
cell involves two steps. First, an erase operation pushes charge off the floating-
gate by applying a large negative voltage on the control gate. Then, a program
(write) operation stores charge on the floating-gate by selectively applying a
large positive voltage if the bit needs to be zero.
An important concept in Flash memory operation is that of pages and blocks.
Pages are the smallest unit in which data is read or written, and are usually
2KB to 8KB. Blocks are the smallest unit for an erase operation and made up of
several pages, usually 32 - 128 pages. Note that Flash does not provide bit-level
program or erase. To read an address from a Flash chip, the page containing the
address is read. To update a value, the block that includes the address must be
first erased. Then, the corresponding page is written with an update and other
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pages in the block are restored.
2.3 Aging
Flash requires high voltages to store and erase information. The voltages in-
volved place great stress on the device oxide; each program operation and each
erase operation slightly damages the oxide, wearing out the device. After thou-
sands of program and erase cycles, the oxide could have sustained enough dam-
age to render the bit non-operational, leaving it in a stuck-at state or in a leaky
state that cannot reliably hold information over a period of time. Flash is usu-
ally guaranteed by the manufacturer up to a certain number of program and
erase cycles.
Even before failures, the stress causes the cell’s analog characteristics to
change. In particular, the program time that is required to flip a state from
’1’ to ’0’ for a cell tends to reduce as the number of program/erase (PE) cycles
increases for that cell. We exploit this program time shift in order to hide infor-
mation.
2.4 Partial Programming
Our information hiding scheme relies on the measurement of program time, the
time it takes to program a Flash cell, at individual cell granularity. However, the
standard Flash memory interface requires all bits in a page to be programmed
together. Normally, a program operation on a page is held for a long enough
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time that any cell level variation within a page is overcome. Therefore, the nor-
mal program time only reveals how long programming the entire page takes,
not how long it takes to program individual bits.
To find the program time on a per-cell basis, we use a technique called “par-
tial programming” [12]. The standard Flash memory interfaces allow the “par-
tial program” of a cell by aborting a program operation before completion. If
the program operation is interrupted, the Flash cell may be in an unreliable state
that could be interpreted as 1 or 0. Further “partial programs” will accumulate
charge on the floating gate and eventually result in the cell entering a stable
programmed state, as if a full program was applied. Effectively, the number of
partial program operations to flip a bit from 1 to 0 represents the program time
for the bit. In this sense, we use the “partial programming” technique to to find
program time for individual cells. After a partial program to a page, we read the
page and record the state of each bit. When a bit changes to the programmed
state (from 1 to 0), we note the number of partial programs required to flip the
bit as the bit’s program time.
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CHAPTER 3
RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION
This chapter first introduces random telegraph noise (RTN) which is a type
of quantum noise. We then show the noise extraction method from the digital
interface of flash memory followed by random number generation algorithms.
Experimental results and evaluation are presented. Finally, we discuss possible
application scenarios and related work.
3.1 Theory and Implementation
3.1.1 Random Telegraph Noise (RTN)
The proposed RNG uses a device effect called Random Telegraph Noise (RTN)
as the source of randomness. In general, RTN refers to the alternating capture
and emission of carriers at a defect site (trap) of a very small electronic device,
which generates discrete variation in the channel current [13]. The capture and
emission times are random and exponentially distributed. RTN behavior can be
distinguished from other noise using the power spectrum density (PSD), which
is flat at low frequencies and 1/f 2 at high frequencies. In Flash memory, the
defects that cause RTN are located in the tunnel-oxide near the substrate. The
RTN amplitude is inversely proportional to the gate area and nearly tempera-
ture independent. As Flash memory cells shrink, RTN effects become relatively
stronger and their impact on the threshold distribution of Flash memory cells,
especially for multi-level cells, can be significant. Because RTN can be a ma-
jor factor in Flash memory reliability, there have been a large number of recent
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studies on RTN in Flash memory from a reliability perspective [14, 15, 16]. While
RTN is a challenge to overcome from the perspective of Flash memory opera-
tions, it can be an ideal source of randomness. RTN is caused by the capture
and emission of an electron at a single trap, and is a physical phenomenon with
random quantum properties. Quantum noise can be seen as the gold-standard
for random number generation because the output of quantum events cannot
be predicted. As Flash memory cells scale to smaller technology nodes, the
RTN effect will become stronger. Moreover, RTN behavior will still exist with
increasing process variation and at extremely low temperatures.
3.1.2 Noise Extraction from Digital Interface
As digital devices, Flash memory is designed to tolerate analog noise; noise
should not affect normal memory operations. In order to observe the noise for
random number generation, a Flash cell needs to be in an unreliable state be-
tween well-defined erase and program states. Interestingly, we found that Flash
cells can be put into the in-between state using the standard digital interface. In
a high level, the approach first erases a page, issues a program command, and
then issues a reset command after an appropriate time period to abort the pro-
gram. This procedure leaves a page partially programmed so that noise can
affect digital outputs. We found that the outcome of continuously reading a
partially programmed bit oscillates between 1 and 0 due to noise.
For Flash memory in practice, experiments show that two types of noise co-
exist: thermal noise and RTN. Thermal noise is white noise that exists in nearly
all electronic devices. RTN can be observed only if a surface trap exists, the
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Figure 3.1: Thermal noise in Flash memory (time domain).
RTN amplitude is larger than that of thermal noise, and the sampling frequency
(speed for continuous reads) is high enough. If any of these three conditions is
not satisfied, only thermal noise will be observed as in Figure 3.1. In the case
of thermal noise, a bit oscillates between the two states quickly, and the power
spectral density (PSD) indicates white noise.
In the case that the RTN amplitude is comparable to thermal noise, a com-
bination of RTN and thermal noise is observed as shown in Figure 3.2. This
is reflected by the density change of 1s in the continuous reading. A moving
average on the time domain helps to visualize the density change. The PSD
of the result shows 1/f 2 spectrum at low frequencies and becomes flat at high
frequencies.
In some cases, the RTN amplitude is very high and dominates thermal noise.
As a result, only RTN behaviors are visible through digital interfaces for these
bits. As shown in Figure 3.3, continuous reads show clear clusters of 1s and 0s
in the time domain. The power spectral density (PSD) of these bit sequences
shows a clear RTN pattern of 1/f 2.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.2: RTN with thermal noise in Flash memory. (a) Time domain. (b)
Moving average of 29 points on the time domain.
For a bit with nearly pure RTN behavior, we further validated that the error
pattern corresponds to RTN by plotting the distributions of up and down peri-
ods. As shown in Figure 3.4, both up time and down time nicely fit an expo-
nential distribution as expected. Overall, our experiments show that both RTN
and thermal noise exist in Flash memory and can be observed through a digital
interface. While both noise types can be used for random number generation,
we focus on RTN, which is more robust to temperature changes.
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Figure 3.3: RTN in Flash memory (time domain).
3.1.3 Random Number Generation Algorithms
In Flash memory devices, RTN manifests as random switching between the
erased state (consecutive 1s) and programmed state (consecutive 0s). At a high-
level, our Flash random number generator (RNG) identifies bits with RTN be-
havior, either pure RTN or RTN combined with thermal noise, and uses a se-
quence of time in the erased state (called up-time) and the time in the pro-
grammed state (called down-time) from those bits. In order to produce ran-
dom binary outputs, the RNG converts the up-time and down-time sequence
into a binary number sequence, and applies the von Neumann extractor for de-
biasing. We found that thermal noise itself is random and does not need to be
filtered out.
Algorithm I shows the overall RNG algorithm. To generate random numbers
from RTN, the first step is to identify bits with RTN or both RTN and thermal
noise. To do this, one block in Flash memory is erased and then multiple incom-
plete programs with the duration of T are applied. After each partial program,
a part of the page is continuously read N times and the outcome is recorded for
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.4: (a) Distribution of time in the programmed state. (b) Distribu-
tion of time in the erased state.
each bit. In our experiments, we chose to read the first 80 bits (10 bytes) in a
page for 1,000 times. For each bit that has not been selected yet, the algorithm
checks if RTN exists using CheckRTN() and marks the bit location if there is
RTN. As an optimization, the algorithm also records the number of partial pro-
grams when a bit is selected. The algorithm repeats the process until all bits
are checked for RTN. The second step is to partially program all of the selected
bits to an appropriate level so that they will show RTN behavior. Finally, the
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Algorithm I Overall Flash RNG algorithm
Erase a block;
Num = 0;
do
Partially program a page for T;
Num++;
Read Nbytes in a page N times, and record a
trace for each bit trace[bit];
For each bit in Nbytes, not selected yet
If (CheckRTN(trace[bit]) == true)
Selected[bit] = yes;
NumProgram[bit] = Num;
End for
repeat until most bits are programmed.
ProgramSelectBits(Selected);
Read selected bits M times, and record up-time and down-time;
For each bit
ConvertToBinary(rawdata);
End for
Figure 3.5: Overall Flash RNG algorithm
algorithm reads the selected bits M times, records a sequence of up-time and
down-time for each bit, and converts the raw data to a binary sequence.
The function CheckRTN() in Algorithm II determines whether there is RTN
in a bit based on a trace from N reads. The algorithm first filters out bits that
almost always (more than 98%) produce one result, either 1 or 0. For the bits
with enough noise, the algorithm uses the power spectral density (PSD) to dis-
tinguish RTN from thermal noise; PSD for RTN has a form of 1/f 2 at a high
frequency. To check this condition, the algorithm computes the PSD, and con-
verts it to a log-scale in both x and y axes. If the result has a slope less than
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Algorithm II Determine whether there is RTN in a bit
If trace[bit] has over 98% 1/0s
Return false;
End if
Calculate the power spectrum density (PSD);
Convert PSD to the log scale in both x-y;
If PSD slope is always < Tslope for all high frequency (> Tfreq)
Return RTN
End if
If PSD slope is < Tslope at least one interval (Invl) at a high frequency (> Tfreq)
Return RTN-Thermal
End if
Figure 3.6: Determine whether there is RTN in a bit
Tslope (we use -1.5, the ideal value is -2) for all frequencies higher than Tfreq
(we use 200Hz), the algorithm categorizes the bit as RTN only. If the PSD has a
slope less than Tslope for any interval larger than than Invl (we use 0.2) at a high
frequency, the bit is categorized as a combination of RTN and thermal noise.
The function ProgramSelectBits() in Algorithm III programs selected bits to
a proper level where RTN can be observed. Essentially, the algorithm aims to
take each bit to the point near where they were identified to have RTN. The
number of partial programs that were required to reach this point before were
recorded in NumProgram[Bit]. For each selected bit, the algorithm first per-
forms partial programs with the duration of T based on the number recorded
earlier (NumProgram[Bit]-K). Then, the algorithm performs up to L more par-
tial program operations until a bit shows RTN behavior. The RTN behavior is
checked by reading the bit N times, and see if the maximum of moving averages
is greater than a threshold (TMax = 0.7) and the minimum is less than another
threshold (TMin = 0.3).
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Algorithm III Program selected bits to proper levels
where RTN could be observed.
For each selected bit
Do (NumProgram[bit]-K) partial programs;
do {
Partially program the bit for T;
Read the bit N times;
Find Max and Min for moving averages;
If Max > TMax and Min < TMin
Break;
End if
} repeat up to L times
End for
Figure 3.7: Program selected bits to proper levels where RTN could be ob-
served.
Algorithm IV Convert the raw data to binary random sequence.
If the bit has both RTN and thermal noise
For each up/down-time in raw data
Output = LSB(up/down-time);
End for
End if
If the bit has only RTN
do {
For each up/down-time in raw data
Output = LSB(up/down-time);
Shift right up/down-time by one bit;
End for
} repeat until all up/down time are zero;
End if
Perform von Neumann de-biasing
Figure 3.8: Convert the raw data to binary random sequence.
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Finally, the function ConvertToBinary() converts the raw data to a binary
random sequence. For bits with both RTN and thermal noise, the up-time and
down-time tend to be short. So only the LSBs of these numbers are used. Es-
sentially, for every up-time and down-time, the algorithm produces 1 if the time
is odd and 0 otherwise. Effectively, this is an even-odd scheme. For bits with
perfect RTN behavior, up-time and down-time tend to be longer and we use
more LSBs from the recorded up/down-time. In this case, we first produce a
bit based on the LSB, then the second LSB, the third LSB, and so on until all
extracted bits become 0. Finally, for both methods, we apply the von Neumann
de-biasing method. The method takes two bits at a time, throws away both bits
if they are identical, and takes the first bit if different. This process is described
in Algorithm IV.
The stability of the bits in the partially programmed state is also important.
We define the stability as how long a bit stays in the partially programmed state
where RTN behavior can be observed. This is determined by the retention time
of the Flash memory chip and the amplitude of the RTN compared to the de-
signed noise margin. Assume the amplitude of the RTN is Ar, the noise margin
of Flash memory is An, and the Flash retention time is 10 year, then the stable
time for random number generation after partial programming will be roughly
Ts = Ar/An ∗ 10 years. This means that after time Ts, a bit needs to be reset and
reprogrammed. In our experiments, the bit that is shown in Figure 3.4 was still
showing ideal RTN behavior even after 12 hours.
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Figure 3.9: Flash test board.
3.2 Experimental Results
This section presents evaluation results for the random number generation tech-
niques for Flash memory devices. The two main metrics for random number
generation are randomness and throughput. For security, the RNG must be
able to reliably generate true random numbers across a range of environmental
conditions over time. For performance, higher throughput will be desirable.
3.2.1 Evaluation Setup
Our experiments use a custom Flash test board as shown in Figure 5.8. The
board is made entirely with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components with
a custom PCB. There is a socket to hold a Flash chip under test, an ARM mi-
croprocessor to issue commands and receive data from the Flash chip, and a
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Manufacturer Part Number Size Qty Process
Hynix HY27UF084G2B 4 Gbit 10 5xnm class
SLC
Micron MT29F2G08ABA 2 Gbit 24 34nm
EAWP-IT:E4 SLC
Micron MT29F16G08CB 16 Gbit 5 –
ACAWP:C MLC
Numonyx NAND04GW 4 Gbit 3 57nm
3B2DN6 SLC
Table 3.1: Tested Flash chips.
Maxim MAX-3233 chip to provide a serial (RS-232) interface. USB support is
integrated into the ARM microcontroller. We also wrote the code to test the de-
vice. The setup represents typical small embedded platforms such as USB Flash
drives, sensor nodes, etc. This device shows that the techniques can be applied
to commercial off-the-shelf devices with no custom integrated circuits (ICs).
The experiments in this paper were performed with four types of Flash
memory chips from Numonyx, Micron and Hynix, as shown in Table 5.1.
3.2.2 Randomness
Historically, three main randomness test suites exist. The first one is from Don-
ald Knuths book The Art of computer Programming (1st edition, 1969) [17]
which is the most quoted reference in statistical testing for RNGs in literature.
Although it was a standard for many decades, it appears to be outdated in to-
days view and it allows many bad generators to pass the tests. The second one
is the diehard test suite from Florida State University. The test suite is stringent
in the sense that they are difficult to pass. However, the suite has not been main-
tained in recent years. Therefore, it was not selected as the tests for this study.
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The third one is developed by National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) which is a measurement standard laboratory and a non-regulatory
agency of the United States Department of Commerce. The NIST Statistical Test
Suite is a package consisting of 15 tests that were developed to test the ran-
domness of arbitrary long binary sequences produced by either hardware or
software. The test suite makes use of both existing algorithms from past liter-
atures and newly developed tests. The most updated version, sts-2.1.1, which
was released in August 11, 2010, is used in our randomness tests. TABLE 3.2
summarizes the 15 NIST tests [2].
Figure 3.10 shows one test result for the even-odd scheme, which only used
an LSB from the up-time and down-time, when bits with both RTN and ther-
mal noise are used. 10 sequences generated from multiple bits are tested and
each sequence consists of 600,000 bits. Note that some of the results are not
shown here due to the space constraint. NonOverlappingTemplate, RandomEx-
cursions and RandomExcursionsVariant have a lot of tests. In the result above,
the proportion in the second column shows the proportion of the sequences
which passed the test. If the proportion is greater than or equal to the threshold
value specified at the bottom of the figure (8 out of 10 or 4 out of 5), then the
data is considered random. The P-value in the first column indicates the unifor-
mity of the P-values calculated in each test. If P-value is greater than or equal
to 0.0001, the sequences can be considered to be uniformly distributed [2]. The
result indicates that the proposed RNG passes all the NIST tests.
We also tested random numbers from one bit with only RTN behavior, us-
ing multiple bits from up-time and down-time. In this case, we generated ten
200,000-bit sequences from one bit. The data passed all NIST tests with results
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Test Name Test Description
1 The Frequency Tests proportion of zeros and
(Monobit) Test ones for the whole sequence.
2 Frequency Test Tests the proportions of ones
within a Block within M-bit Block.
3 The Run Test Tests the total number of runs in the
sequence, where a run is an uninterrupted
sequence of identical bits
4 Tests for the Longest- Tests the longest run of ones within M-bit
Run-of-Ones in a Block Block and consistency with theory
5 The Binary Matrix Tests rank of disjoint sub-matrices
Rank Test of the entire sequence and independence
6 The Discrete Fourier Tests the peak heights in the Discrete Fourier
Transform (Spectral) Test Transform of the sequence, to detect periodic
features that indicates deviation of randomness
7 The Non-overlapping Tests the number of occurrences of
Template Matching Test a pre-specified target strings
8 The Overlapping Tests the number of occurrences of a
Template Matching Test pre-specified target strings. When window
found, slide only one bit before the next search
9 Maurers Universal Tests the number of bits
Statistics Test between matching patterns
10 The Linear Tests the length of a linear feedback
Complexity Test shift register, test complexity
11 The Serial Test Tests the frequency of all
possible overlapping m-bit pattern
12 The Approximate Tests the frequency of all possible overlapping
Entropy Test m-bits pattern across the entire sequence
13 The Cumulative Tests maximal excursion from the random walk
Sums (Cusums) Test defined by the cumulative sum of adjusted
(-1, +1) digits in the sequence
14 The Random Tests the number of cycles having exactly K
Excursion Test visits in a cumulative sum random walk
15 The Random Excursions Tests the total number of times that a particular
Variant Test state is visited in a cumulative sum random walk
Table 3.2: Summary of the NIST test suite
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Figure 3.10: NIST test suite results for bits with RTN and thermal noise.
that are similar to the above case. For the Universal test, which requires a se-
quence longer than 387,840 bits, we used five 500,000-bit sequences.
3.2.3 Performance
The throughput of the proposed RNG varies significantly depending on the
switching rate of individual bits, sampling speed and environment conditions.
Typically, only a small fraction of bits show pure RTN behavior with minimal
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Chip Hynix Numonyx Micron Micron
SLC SLC SLC MLC
Reading speed (KHz) 46.51 45.25 43.10 17.78
Number of bits characterized 303 478 1030 134
Number of bits identified 9 16 5 0
Max throughput (bits/sec) 8.03K 5.35K 2.71K –
Ave. throughput (bits/sec) 3.27K 1.79K 848.29 –
Min throughput (bits/sec) 107.04 34.77 8.14 –
Table 3.3: Performance of bits with pure RTN behavior.
Chip Hynix Numonyx Micron Micron
SLC SLC SLC MLC
Reading speed (KHz) 46.51 45.25 43.10 17.78
Number of bits characterized 303 478 1030 134
Number of bits identified 27 81 58 28
Max throughput (bits/sec) 11.48K 9.68K 10.03K 3.83K
Ave. throughput (bits/sec) 3.28K 3.87K 3.53K 1.26K
Min throughput (bits/sec) 28.39 10.21 8.14 55.12
Table 3.4: Performance of bits with both RTN and thermal noise.
thermal noise. TABLE 3.3 shows the performance of Flash chips from four
manufacturers. The average throughput ranges from 848 bits/second to 3.37
Kbits/second. Note that the fastest switching trap that can be identified is lim-
ited by the reading speed in our experiments.
If bits with both RTN and thermal noise are also used, the percentage of bits
which can be used for RNG can be much higher. The performance of these bits
from the same Flash chips as in the pure RTN case is shown in TABLE 3.4. The
average throughputs are higher because thermal noise is high frequency noise.
In our tests, the RNG throughput is largely limited by the timing of the asyn-
chronous interface which is controlled by an ARM microcontroller with CPU
frequency of 60MHz and the 8-bit bus for a Flash chip. We believe that the
RNG performance can be much higher if data can be transferred more quickly
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through the interface. As an example, the average for RTN transition time is re-
ported to range from 1 microsecond to 10 seconds [18]. If a 128 bytes can be read
in 6 microseconds which is the ideal random cache read speed for the Micron
SLC chips, a RTN bit with 0.1ms average transition time will give approximately
20 Kbits/second throughput. Note that one page could have multiple RTN bits
and our algorithm allows using multiple bits in parallel so that the aggregated
throughput of an RNG can be much higher. For example, if N bits can be read
at a time, in theory, that can increase the throughput by a factor of N.
3.2.4 Temperature Variations
For traditional hardware RNGs, low temperatures present a particular chal-
lenge because thermal noise, which they typically rely on, can be reduced with
the temperature. To study the effectiveness of the Flash-based RNG in low
temperatures, we tested the scheme at two low temperature settings: one in
a freezer, which is about -5C, and the other in dry ice, which is about -80C.
The generated random sequences are tested individually as well as combined
together with data from experiments at room temperature. All of them passed
the NIST test suite without a problem, showing that our technique is effective
at low temperatures.
Note that the experiments for temperature variations and aging are per-
formed with a setup where data from Flash memory are transferred from a
testbed to a PC through an USB interface. The post processing is performed on
the PC. The USB interface limits the Flash read speed to 6.67KHz. As a result,
the throughput in this setup is noticeably slower than the results in previous
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subsections where the entire RNG operation is performed on a microcontroller.
To understand the impact of temperature variations on the Flash-based
RNG, we tested the first 80 bits of a page from a Numonyx chip. At room tem-
perature, 62 bits out of the 80 bits showed oscillations between the programmed
state and erased state. 14 bits out of the 62 bits were selected by the selection
algorithm, which identifies bits with pure RTN or both RTN and thermal com-
ponents. The throughputs of the 14 bits are shown in Figure 3.11.
Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13 show the performance of the RNG at -5 C and
-80 C, respectively. At -5 C, 79 bits out of 80 bits showed noisy behavior and 20
out of 79 bits were selected by the RNG algorithm as ones with RTN. At -80 C,
72 bits out of 80 bits showed noise and 28 out of 72 bits were selected as the ones
with RTN. On average, we found that per-bit throughput is slightly decreased
at low temperatures, most likely because of reduced thermal noise and possibly
because of slowed RTN switching. However, the difference is not significant. In
fact, a previous study [19] claimed that RTN is temperature independent below
10 Kelvin. Interestingly, we found that the number of bits that are selected by
our algorithm as ones with RTN behavior increases at a low temperature. This
trend is likely to be because the low temperature decreases thermal noise ampli-
tude while RTN amplitude stays almost the same and the RTN traps slow down
so that they become observable at our sampling frequency.
3.2.5 Aging
Flash devices wear-out over time as more program/erase (P/E) operations are
performed. A typical SLC Flash chip has a lifetime of 1 million P/E cycles. In the
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Figure 3.11: Throughputs under room temperature.
Figure 3.12: Throughput at -5 C.
context of RNGs, however, we do not think that wear-outs cause concerns. In
fact, aging can create new RTN traps and increase the number of bits with RTN.
To check the impact of aging on the RNG, we tested the scheme after 1,000 P/E
operations and 10,000 P/E operations as shown in TABLE 3.5. The RNG outputs
passed the NIST test suite in both cases and did not show any degradation in
performance.
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Figure 3.13: Throughputs at -80 C.
Stress (P/E) Bits with noise Bits selected Ave. throughput (bits/sec)
1,000 64 9 303.26
10,000 70 15 239.66
Table 3.5: Performance summary of RTN in stressed pages
The table shows an interesting trend that more bits show RTN behavior after
10,000 P/E cycles. The increase in noisy bits can potentially increase the overall
RNG throughput. One possible concern with aging is a decrease in stable time
period during which each bit shows noisy behavior. In our experiments, we
found that a bit can be used for random number generation for over 12 hours
after one programming (Algorithm III). If a bit is completely worn out, charge
can leak out more quickly, requiring more frequent calibration. However, given
that Flash memory is designed to have a retention time of 10 years within its
lifetime, we do not expect the leakage to be a significant problem. We plan to
perform larger scale experiments to understand how often a bit needs to be re-
programmed for reliable random number generation. In practice, a check can
also be added to ensure that a bit oscillates between 1 and 0.
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3.3 Application Scenarios
This section briefly discusses how the Flash memory based security functions,
namely RNGs and device fingerprints, can be used to improve security of elec-
tronic devices. We first discuss where the techniques can be deployed and
present a few use cases.
The proposed Flash-based security techniques work with commercial off-
the-shelf Flash memory chips using standard interfaces. For example, our pro-
totype design is based on the Open NAND Flash Interface (ONFI) [20], which
is used by many major Flash vendors including Intel, Hynix, Micron, and San-
Disk. Other Flash vendors such as Samsung and Toshiba also use similar in-
terfaces to their chips. The proposed techniques can be applied to any Flash or
other floating-gate non-volatile memory, as long as one can control read, pro-
gram (write), and erase operations to specific memory locations (pages and
blocks), issue the RESET command and disable internal ECC. Embedded sys-
tems typically implement a Flash memory controller in software, exposing the
low-level Flash chip interface to a software layer. Our prototype USB board in
the evaluation section is an example of such a design. While we did not have
a chance to study details, the manual for the TI OMAP processor family [21],
which is widely used in mobile phones, indicates that its External Memory In-
terface (EMI) requires software to control each phase of NAND Flash accesses.
In such platforms where Flash accesses are controlled by software, our tech-
niques can be implemented as relatively simple software changes.
For large memory components such as SSDs, the low-level interfaces to Flash
memory chips may not be exposed to a system software layer. For example, SSD
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controllers often implement wear-leveling schemes that move data to a new
location on writes. In such devices, the device vendor needs to either expose
the Flash interfaces to higher level software or implement the security functions
in firmware.
The Flash-based random number generator (RNG) can either replace or com-
plement software pseudo random number generators in any applications that
need sources of randomness. For example, random numbers may be used as
nonces in communication protocols to prevent replays or used to generate new
cryptographic keys. Effectively, the Flash memory provides the benefits of hard-
ware RNGs for systems without requiring custom RNG circuits. For example,
with the proposed technique, low-cost embedded systems such as sensor net-
work nodes can easily generate random numbers from Flash/EEPROM. Simi-
larly, virtual machines on servers can obtain true random numbers even without
hardware RNGs.
3.4 Related Work
Hardware random number generators generate random numbers from high-
entropy sources in the physical world. Theoretically, some random physical
processes are completely unpredictable. Therefore, hardware random number
generators provide better random numbers in terms of randomness than soft-
ware based pseudo-random number generators.
Thermal noise and other system level noise are the common entropy sources
in recently proposed hardware random number generators. In [22], the phase
noise of identical ring oscillators is used as the entropy source. In [23], the dif-
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ferences in path delays are used. In [24] and [25], the metastability of flip-flops
or two cross coupled inverters are used. Basically, the entropy source of these
RNG designs is thermal noise and circuit operational conditions. These hard-
ware random number generators can usually achieve high throughput because
the frequency of the entropy sources is high. One common characteristic of these
hardware random generators is that they all need carefully designed circuits
where process variations should be minimized so that noises from the entropy
source can be dominant. Compared to this, the random number generation in
Flash memory cells does not require specially designed circuits and is more im-
mune to process variation. Moreover, our entropy source is based on quantum
behavior and theoretically, it should still work under extremely low tempera-
tures where thermal noise or other kinds of noise decrease dramatically.
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CHAPTER 4
DEVICE FINGERPRINTS
4.1 Theory and Implementation
This section describes techniques to generate unique fingerprints from Flash
memory devices.
4.1.1 Sources of Uniqueness
Flash memory is subject to random process variation like any other semiconduc-
tor device. Because Flash is fabricated for maximum density, small variations
can be significant. Process variation can cause each bit of a Flash memory to dif-
fer from its neighbors. While variation may affect many aspects of Flash cells,
our fingerprinting technique exploits threshold voltage variations. Variations in
doping, floating gate oxide thickness, and control-gate coupling ratio can cause
the threshold voltage of each transistor to vary. Because of this threshold volt-
age variation, different Flash cells will need different times to be programmed.
4.1.2 Extracting Fingerprints
In this paper, we introduce a fingerprinting scheme based on partial program-
ming. We repeatedly partially program a page on a Flash chip. After each par-
tial program, some bits will have been programmed enough to flip their states
from 1 to 0. For each bit in the page, we record the order in which the bit flipped.
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Algorithm V Extract the order in which bits in a page
reach the programmed state.
Choose a partial programming time T (below the
rated program time).
Nbits = number of bits in one page
Order = 1;
Initialize BitRank[Nbits] to 0.
do {
Partially program a page for T;
For all programmed bits do
BitRank[programmed bit] = Order;
End for
Order = Order + 1;
} repeat until most (99%) bits in the page are programmed
Figure 4.1: Extract the order in which bits in a page reach the programmed
state.
Pseudo-code is provided in Algorithm V. In our experiments, T is chosen to be
29.3us. A short partial program time provide a better resolution to distinguish
different bits with the cost of increased fingerprinting time. We do not enforce
all bits to be programmed, in order to account for the possibility of faulty bits.
4.1.3 Comparing Fingerprints
The fingerprints extracted from the same page on the same chip over time are
noisy but highly correlated. To compare fingerprints extracted from the same
page/chip and different pages/chips, we use the Pearson correlation coefficient
[5], which is defined as
P (x, y) =
E[(X − µX)(Y − µY )]
σXσY
(4.1)
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where X is the vector of program orders extracted from one experiment and
Y is another vector of program orders extracted from another experiment. µX
and σX are the mean and standard deviation of the X vector. µY and σY are the
mean and standard deviation of the Y vector.
In this way, the vector of program orders is treated as a vector of real-
izations of a random variable. For vectors extracted from the same page,
Y = aX + b + noise where a and b are constants and the noise is small. So,
X and Y are highly correlated and the correlation coefficient should be close to
1. For vectors extracted from different pages, X and Y should be nearly indepen-
dent of each other, so the correlation coefficient should be close to zero. From
another perspective, if both X[i] and Y[i] are smaller or bigger than their means,
(X[i] − µX)(Y [i] − µY ) would be a positive number. If not, it would be a nega-
tive number. If X and Y are independent, it is equally likely to be positive and
negative so the correlation coefficient would approach 0.
The scatter plot of X and Y from the same page/chip and from different
chips are shown in Figure 4.2. The figure clearly demonstrates a high correla-
tion between fingerprints from the same chip over time and a low correlation
between fingerprints from different chips. Therefore, this correlation metric can
be used to compare fingerprints to determine whether they are from the same
page/chip or from different pages/chips.
4.1.4 Fingerprints in Binary Numbers
The above fingerprints are in the form of the order in which each bit was pro-
grammed. If an application requires a binary number such as in generating
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.2: Scatter plot for fingerprints extracted on (a) the same page and
(b) different chips.
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Algorithm VI Generate a binary signature from the partial
programming order information.
Pick threshold t =Max(BitRank)/2
For each bit
If BitRank[bit] > t
Output 1
Else Output 0
End for
Figure 4.3: Generate a binary signature from the partial programming or-
der information.
cryptographic keys, we need to convert the recorded ordering into a binary
number.
There are a couple of ways to generate unique and unpredictable binary
numbers from the Flash fingerprints. First, we can use a threshold to convert
a fingerprint based on the programming order into a binary number as shown
in Algorithm VI. In the algorithm, we produce 1 if the program order is high, or
0 otherwise. This approach produces a 1 bit fingerprint for each Flash bit. Alter-
natively, we can obtain a similar binary fingerprint directly from Flash memory
by partially programming (or erasing) a page and reading bits (1/0) from the
Flash.
4.2 Evaluation
The experiment setup and tested devices are the same as in the previous chapter.
For fingerprinting, we are interested in uniqueness and robustness of finger-
prints. The fingerprint should be unique, which means that fingerprints from
different chips or different locations of the same chip must be significantly dif-
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ferent the correlation coefficient should be low. The fingerprint should also be
robust, in a sense that fingerprints from a given location of a chip must stay
stable over time and even under different environmental conditions the corre-
lation coefficient should be high.
In the experiments detailed below, we used 24 chips (Micron 34nm SLC),
and 24 pages (6 pages in 4 blocks) from each chip. 10 measurements were made
from each page. Each page has 16,384 bits.
4.2.1 Uniqueness
To test uniqueness, we compared the fingerprint of a page to the fingerprints
of the same page on different chips, and recorded their correlation coefficients.
A total of 66,240 pairs were compared (24 chips choose 2) * 24 pages * 10 mea-
surements. The results are shown in Figure 4.4. The correlation coefficients are
very low, with an average of 0.0076. A Gaussian distribution fits the data well,
as shown in red.
The correlation coefficients are also very low when a page is compared not
only to the same page on different chips, but also to different pages on the same
and different chips, shown in Figure 4.5. There are 1,656,000 pairs in comparison
((24 pages * 24 chips) choose 2) * 10 measurements. This indicates that finger-
prints from different parts (pages) of a chip can be considered as two different
fingerprints and do not have much correlation. Therefore, the fingerprinting
scheme allows the generation of many independent fingerprints from a single
chip. The average correlation coefficient in this case is 0.0072.
41
Figure 4.4: Histogram of correlation coefficients for pages compared to the
same page on a different chip (total 66,240 comparisons).
Figure 4.5: Histogram of correlation coefficients for every page compared
to every other page at room temp (total 1,656,000 comparisons).
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Figure 4.6: Histogram of correlation coefficients for all intra-chip compar-
isons (total 25,920 comparisons).
4.2.2 Robustness
To test robustness, we compared each pages measurement to the 9 other mea-
surements of the same pages fingerprint (an intra-chip measurement). The his-
togram of results for all pages is shown in Figure 4.6. The correlation coefficient
for fingerprints from the same page is very high, with an average of 0.9673.
The minimum observed coefficient is 0.9022. The results show that fingerprints
from the same page are robust over multiple measurements, and can be easily
distinguished from fingerprints of a different chip or page.
To be used in an authentication scheme, one could set a threshold correlation
coefficient t. If, when comparing two fingerprints, their correlation coefficient is
above t, then the two fingerprints are considered to have come from the same
page/chip. If their correlation coefficient is below t, then the fingerprints are
assumed to be from different pages/chips.
In such a scheme, there is a potential concern for false positives and false
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negatives. A false negative is defined as comparing fingerprints that are actually
from two different pages/chips, but deciding that the fingerprints are from the
same page/chip. A false positive occurs when comparing fingerprints from
the same page/chip, yet deciding that the fingerprints came from two different
pages/chips. The threshold t can be selected to balance false negatives and
positives. A high value of t would minimize false negatives, but increase the
chance of false positives, and vice versa.
To estimate the chance of false positives and false negatives, we fit normal
probability mass distribution functions to the correlation coefficient distribu-
tion. A false positive would arise from a comparison of two fingerprints from
the same page being below t. The normal distribution fitted to the intra-chip
comparison data in Figure 4.6 has an average µ = 0.9722 and a std. deviation of
0.0095. For a threshold of t = 0.5, the normal distribution function estimates the
cumulative probability of a pair of fingerprints having a correlation coefficient
below 0.5 as 2.62 ∗ 10539. At t = 0.7, the probability is estimated as 7.43 ∗ 10−181.
The normal distribution function fitted to the inter-chip comparison data in
Figure 4.5 has a µ = 0.0076 and a std. deviation of 0.0083. The estimated chance
of a pair of fingerprints from different chips exceeding t = 0.5 is 4.52∗10−815. At
t = 0.3, the probability is estimated as 6.14 ∗ 10−301.
The tight inter-chip and intra-chip correlations along with low probability
estimates for false positives or negatives suggest that the size of fingerprints can
possibly be reduced. Instead of using all 16,384 bits in a page, we can generate
a fingerprint for a 1024-bit, 512-bit, or even only a 256-bit block. Experiments
show that the averages of the observed correlation coefficients remain similar
to those when using every bit in a page while the standard deviation increases
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by a factor of 2-3. However, the worst-case false negative estimates remain low.
When using 256 bit fingerprints with the threshold t = 0.3, the estimate is 7.91 ∗
10−7. Under the same conditions, using 1024 bit fingerprints gives an estimated
3.20 ∗ 10−22 chance of a false negative.
4.2.3 Temperature Variations and Aging
To see how robust the fingerprints are across different temperatures. We ex-
tracted fingerprints from chips at two other ambient temperatures, 60 C and -5
C. We tested a subset of the chips tested at room temperature 6 pages (3 pages
in 2 blocks) in 6 chips.
Of interest is how fingerprints from the same page/chip, but taken at dif-
ferent temperatures, compare. Figure 4.7 shows the results of the intra-chip
comparison between each temperature pair. Correlations remain high for fin-
gerprints from the same page/chip, indicating that fingerprints taken at differ-
ent temperatures can still be identified as the same. The average correlation
coefficient is lower than when compared without a temperature difference, but
is still sufficiently high to have very low false positive rates.
Comparing fingerprints from the same page at the same temperature at -5
C or 60 C still yields high correlation coefficients, as expected. Comparisons of
fingerprints from different pages/chips at different temperatures give very low
correlation coefficients.
Flash chips have a limited lifetime, wearing out over many program/erase
(P/E) cycles. For a pages fingerprint to be useful over time, fingerprints taken
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Figure 4.7: Average, minimum, and maximum correlation coefficients for
intra-chip comparisons between different ambient tempera-
tures.
Figure 4.8: Average, minimum, and maximum correlation coefficients for
comparisons between fresh and stressed Flash.
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later in life should still give high correlation with younger fingerprints. Fig-
ure 4.8 shows the results of comparing fingerprints for the same page/chip
taken when a Flash chip is new to fingerprints taken after a different number of
P/E cycles. While the average correlation coefficient goes down noticeably, we
note that it appears to bend towards an asymptote as the chip wears out. Even
after 500,000 P/E cycles, which is beyond the typical lifetime of Flash chips, the
average coefficient is still high enough to distinguish fingerprints of the same
page/chip from fingerprints acquired from a different page/chip.
However, we found that an extreme wear-out such as 500,000 P/E cycles
can raise a non-negligible false positive concern (10−4) for short 256 or 512-bit
fingerprints. This result indicates that we need longer fingerprints if they need
to be used over a long period of time without a re-calibration.
4.2.4 Security
An attacker could attempt to store the fingerprints of a Flash device and replay
the fingerprint to convince a verifier that he has the Flash chip in question. If the
attacker cannot predict which page(s) or parts of a page (for shorter signatures)
will be fingerprinted, he would need to store the fingerprints for every page to
ensure success. The Flash chips in our experiments required about 800 partial
program cycles per fingerprint. As the fingerprint comprises the order in which
the bit was programmed, each bits ordering could be stored as a 10-bit number.
To store an entire chips fingerprints would require 10x the chip storage.
Acquiring a single fingerprint is relatively fast. Our setup could record an
entire pages fingerprint in about 10 seconds. However, there are 131,072 pages
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on our (relatively small) test chip; characterizing one chip would take about 2
weeks. The characterization time depends on the speed of the Flash interface,
and we plan to further investigate the limit on how fast fingerprints can be char-
acterized.
4.2.5 Applicability to Multiple Flash Chips
Most of the above experimental results are obtained from the Micron SLC Flash
memory. In order to answer the question of whether the proposed techniques
are applicable to Flash memory in general, we have repeated both RNG and
fingerprinting tests on four types of Flash memory chips in Table 5.1, including
an MLC chip.
The experiments showed that RNG and fingerprinting both work on all four
types of Flash chips, with comparable performance. Detailed results are not
included as they do not add new information.
While we found that the proposed algorithm works without any change in
most cases, there was one exception where the fingerprinting algorithm needed
to be slightly modified in order to compensate for systematic variations for cer-
tain manufacturers. For example, for the Hynix and Numonyx chips, we found
that bits from the even bytes of a page tend to be programmed quicker than
bits from the odd bytes. Similarly, for the MLC chip, bits in a page divide into
two groups: a quickly programmed group and a slowly programmed group.
To accommodate such systematic behaviors, the fingerprinting algorithm was
changed to only compare programming ordering of bits within the same group.
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4.3 Application Scenarios
One application of the Flash device fingerprints is to identify and/or authenti-
cate hardware devices themselves similar to the way that we use biometrics to
identify humans.
As an example, let us consider distinguishing genuine Flash memory chips
from counterfeits through an untrusted supply chain. Recent articles report
multiple incidents of counterfeit Flash devices in practice, such as chips from
low-end manufacturers, defective chips, and ones harvested from thrown-away
electronics, etc. [5, 26, 27]. The counterfeit chips cause a serious concern for con-
sumers in terms of reliability as well as security; counterfeits may contain mali-
cious functions. Counterfeits also damage the brand name for a manufacturer.
The Flash fingerprints can enable authentication of genuine chips without
any additional hardware modifications to todays Flash chips. In a simple pro-
tocol, a Flash manufacturer can put an identifier (ID) to a genuine chip (write to
a location in Flash memory), generate a fingerprint from the chip, and store the
fingerprint in a database along with the ID. To check the authenticity of a Flash
chip from a supply chain, a customer can regenerate a fingerprint and query the
manufacturers database to see if it matches the saved fingerprint.
In order to pass the check, a counterfeit chip needs to produce the same
fingerprint as a genuine one. Interestingly, unlike simple identifiers and keys
stored in memory, device fingerprints based on random manufacturing varia-
tions cannot be controlled even when a desired fingerprint is known. For ex-
ample, even legitimate Flash manufacturers cannot precisely control individual
transistor threshold voltages, which we use to generate fingerprints. To pro-
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Figure 4.9: Device authentication through a challenge-response protocol.
duce specific fingerprints, one will need to create a custom chip that stores the
fingerprints and emulates Flash responses.
The authentication scheme can be strengthened against emulation attacks by
exploiting a large number of bits in Flash memory. Figure 4.9 illustrates a mod-
ified protocol that utilizes a large number of fingerprints that can be generated
from each Flash chip. Here, we consider a Flash chip as a function where a dif-
ferent set of bits that are used to generate a fingerprint is a challenge, and the
resulting fingerprint is a response. A device manufacturer, when in possession
of a genuine IC, applies randomly chosen challenges to obtain responses. Then,
these challenge-response pairs (CRP) are stored in a database for future authen-
tication operations. To check the authenticity of an IC later, a CRP that has been
previously recorded but has never been used for a check is selected from the
database, and a re-generated response from a device can be checked.
Unless an adversary can predict which CRPs will be used for authentication,
the adversary needs to measure all (or at least a large fraction) of possible fin-
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gerprints from an authentic Flash chip and store them in an emulator. In our
prototype board, a generation of all fingerprints from a single page (16K bits)
takes about 10 seconds and requires 10 bits of storage for each Flash bit. For
a 16Gbit (2 GB) Flash chip, which is a moderate size by todays standards, this
implies that fully characterizing the chip will take hundreds of days and 20 GB
storage. In the context of counterfeiting, such costs are likely to be high enough
to make producing counterfeits economically unattractive.
The security of the authentication scheme based on Flash fingerprints can be
further improved if an additional control can be added to the Flash interface.
For example, imagine using a USB Flash memory as a two-factor authentication
token by updating its firmware to have a challenge-response interface for Flash
fingerprints. Given that authentication operations only need to be infrequent,
the USB stick can be configured to only allow a query every few seconds. If a
fingerprint is based on 1024 Flash bits, fully characterizing an 8 GB USB stick
can take tens of years.
In addition to device identification and authentication, the Flash fingerprints
can be used as a way to produce many independent secret keys without addi-
tional storage. In effect, the proposed Flash fingerprints provide unpredictable
and persistent numbers for each device. Previous studies such as fuzzy extrac-
tors [28] and Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [3] have shown how sym-
metric keys (uniformly distributed random numbers) can be obtained from bio-
metric data or IC signatures from manufacturing variations by applying hash-
ing and error correction. The same approach can be applied to Flash fingerprints
in order to generate reliable cryptographic keys. A typical Flash with a few GB
can potentially produce tens of millions of 128-bit symmetric keys.
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4.4 Related Work
Instead of conventional authentication based on a secret key and cryptographic
computation, researchers have recently proposed to use the inherent variation
in physical characteristics of a hardware device for identification and authen-
tication. Process variation in semiconductor foundries is a common source of
hardware uniqueness which is out of the control of the designer [29, 30, 31]. A
unique fingerprint can be extracted and used to identify the chip, but cannot be
used for security applications because it can be simply stored and replayed. We
also take advantage of process variation for our fingerprinting scheme. For se-
curity applications, Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been proposed.
A PUF can generate many fingerprints per device by using complex physical
systems whose analog characteristics cannot be perfectly replicated. Pappu ini-
tially proposed PUFs [32] using light scattering patterns of optically transparent
tokens. In silicon, researchers have constructed circuits which, due to random
process variation, emit unique outputs per device. Some silicon PUFs use ring
oscillators [33] or race conditions between two identical delay paths [34]. These
PUFs are usually implemented as custom circuits on the chip. Recently, PUFs
have been implemented without additional circuitry by exploiting metastable
elements such as SRAM cells, which have unique value on start-up for each
IC instance [4, 35], or in Flash memories [5]. Our authentication scheme re-
quires no new circuitry and can be done with commercially available and ubiq-
uitous Flash chips. Unlike metastable elements, authentication does not require
a power cycle. The scheme can generate many fingerprints by using more pages
in the Flash chip. Acquiring a fingerprint is also faster and more widely appli-
cable than previous Flash authentication methods.
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CHAPTER 5
HIDING INFORMATION IN FLASH MEMORY
5.1 Overview
5.1.1 Threat Model
Figure 5.1 shows the overview of the information hiding process in Flash mem-
ory. In order to hide information in Flash, Alice (left) first adds an error cor-
recting code (ECC) to her message payload and hides the payload in the analog
characteristics in Flash memory. Later, Alice (right) can perform the reverse
operations to retrieve the hidden payload by recovering bits from the analog
characteristics and correct errors using the ECC. The information hiding and re-
covery algorithms use a secret key (hiding key) to determine where the hidden
bits are stored in Flash memory. As error correcting codes are well studied, this
paper focuses on the physical encoding and decoding of information in Flash.
As shown in the figure, an adversary (Eve) gets temporary access to the
Flash memory after Alice hides information. We assume that the adversary can
inspect and manipulate the memory through its normal interface, but do not
consider physical tampering of the memory. In the simple case, the adversary
can check normal Flash operations such as program, erase, and read operations.
The adversary may also be aware of the information hiding technique and can
specifically check analog characteristics of Flash memory that can be observed
through the standard interface.
The goal of the adversary may differ depending on the target application. In
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Figure 5.1: The overview of the information hiding operation.
particular, the adversary may try to
• Detect the existence of hidden information,
• Retrieve the hidden information, or
• Remove the hidden information.
For example, in the traditional steganography context where Alice is trying to
establish a covert communication channel, it is important that the adversary
cannot easily detect the existence of hidden information. On the other hand, in
the context of storing sensitive information, it is more important that the adver-
sary cannot retrieve information without knowing the hiding key. For water-
marking, it should be difficult to erase the hidden information.
Given an unlimited amount of time with the Flash chip, an adversary can
break the information hiding scheme by trying the retrieval algorithm on all
pages with all possible hiding key values because we assume that an adversary
knows our hiding algorithm. Therefore, the goal of the hiding technique is to
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make the detection, retrieval, and removal of hidden information sufficiently
time consuming for an attacker.
5.1.2 Flash Interface Requirements
The proposed technique is designed to work with Flash or other floating-gate
non-volatile memory, as long as one can control read, program (write), and erase
operations to specific memory locations (pages and blocks), issue the RESET
command, and disable internal ECC (if there is any). For example, our exper-
iments use off-the-shelf Flash chips that use the Open NAND Flash Interface
(ONFI) [20], which is used by many major Flash vendors including Intel, Hynix,
Micron, and SanDisk. Other Flash vendors such as Samsung and Toshiba also
use similar interfaces to their chips. In many embedded and mobile devices, the
required interface functions are already exposed to the software layers so that
the proposed technique can be simply implemented as a software update.
5.2 Information Hiding Algorithm
This section describes the encoding (hiding) and decoding (recovery) algo-
rithms for our information hiding scheme and the rationale for them.
5.2.1 Overview
Our scheme hides information in the program time of individual bits of Flash.
The program time is the time it takes for a bit to change from the erased state
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Figure 5.2: Raw partial program number for each bit in an example page.
(1) to the programmed state (0). Normally, a Flash memory controller performs
a program operation at a page granularity, and the latency of this program op-
eration is determined by the slowest bit in a page to be successfully written. In
order to determine the program time for each bit, which we refer to as per-bit
program time, we use the partial programming technique that is described in the
previous section.
Figure 5.2 shows per-bit program times for a page. The plot shows the num-
ber of partial program operations to flip state from 1 to 0 for each bit in a page.
Because of process variations, the program time varies widely from bit to bit
as shown in the figure. The per-bit program time distribution for the page is
shown in Figure 5.3. The wide distribution and noisy appearance of per-bit
program times suggest that small changes to each bit’s program time would go
unnoticed, and could be used to carry a covert payload.
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Figure 5.3: Partial program time distribution for bits in a page.
However, in order to hide information using the program time, we need to
be able to intentionally change and control each bit’s program time. Interest-
ingly, in this context, previous work has observed that program time tends to
decrease as a Flash cell becomes more worn-out [36, 5]. In this work, we also
found that how worn-out each bit is can be controlled by selectively stressing a
bit. Although one can only program an entire page together, we can stress some
bits within a page more than others by controlling the value that we write. Dur-
ing an erase operation, every bit in a page is reset to an erased state (for example,
assume that the erased state represents ’1’). On a program operation, only bits
that switch to 0 experience the program stress. When these bits are later erased,
they also experience erase stress as they are reverted to the 1 state. Therefore,
bits that undergo both switches (1 to 0 and 0 to 1) see the full program and erase
stress from one program and erase cycle. However, bits that store 1 will not
be switched to the 0 state by a program operation. These bits see much less
57
program and erase stress than their counterparts which are programmed to 0
because their states do not need to change. Therefore, by deciding whether to
write a 1 or a 0 to each bit location in a page, we can control which bits are
stressed more relative to other bits in the same page.
In theory, if every bit had a similar program time without much variation,
we could hide one bit of information in every Flash bit by simply stressing or
not stressing the bit so that its program time encodes the hidden bit. However,
in practice, the program times of individual bits vary significantly due to man-
ufacturing variations, and intentional stress is often not sufficient to overcome
the inherent variations; inherently slow bits will be likely to be still slower than
inherently fast bits even after being deliberately stressed. To address this issue,
we choose to encode 1 bit of hidden information using many bits in Flash mem-
ory. For each bit to hide, we choose a group of Flash bits and program them to
the same value, either 1 or 0. Effectively, this process encodes a bit in the collec-
tive program time of the group. The averaging effect reduces variations among
different groups and allows the hidden bit to be more reliably recovered.
The use of a group also improves the security of the hiding scheme. In our
scheme, we use a key (hiding key) to select which Flash bits will be grouped
together for each hidden bit. If an attacker does not know the correct key, he
or she cannot accurately identify which bits form a group together. Because an
incorrect group is likely to contain both more stressed and less stressed bits, the
average program time of an incorrect group of bits will not show a clear bias
towards either 1 or 0.
For example, Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of the average program time
of a correct group. In the experiment, we randomly selected 5,120 groups, each
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Figure 5.4: The distribution of the average program time of a group with
a correct key.
of which has 128 bits from a page, and hid either 1 or 0. As shown in the figure,
these is an obvious gap in the distribution between the fast and slow groups.
Therefore, the value of hidden bits can be easily recovered through a simple
thresholding.
On the other hand, Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of the average program
time when the hiding key is unknown. In this experiment, we used a randomly
selected hiding key. As shown in the figure, the average program time of a
group shows a normal distribution without any clear separation. This result
suggests that it is difficult for an adversary to recover hidden information with-
out correct groupings because each group is likely to have both more and less
stressed bits.
59
Figure 5.5: The distribution of the average program time of a incorrect
group.
5.2.2 Hiding Algorithm
Figure 5.6 describes our methodology for hiding a payload in program time of
Flash memory. The algorithm is split into two parts: (A) composing the payload
by assigning bits of the message to groups of bits in Flash, and then (B) the actual
process of writing the payload to Flash by repeated program and erase stress.
For a given message, we first choose a set of pages and blocks in which to
encode the message based on the hiding key and the number bits that need to be
hidden. Then, we divide the bits within each page into fixed size groups. Each
group is used to store one message bit. The page, block, and group selections
are based on the hiding key in a way that cannot be predicted without the key.
In our implementation, we used RC4 to choose the Flash bit locations for each
message bit.
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Algorithm I: Encoding
Part A – Composing the message
1 For each selected page in a block
2 Generate the group for each message bit via the page hiding key
3 Assign each group 0 or 1 according to the embedded data
4 For each bit
5 If its group will represent a message ”1”
6 Set it to be programmed 0
7 Else
8 Set it to be programmed 1
9 End if
10 End for
11 End for
Part B – Writing the message to Flash
1 For each selected block
2 For i = 1, 2, .., N (N is the number of Hiding PE cycles)
3 Erase the block
4 Program every selected page
5 End for
6 End for
Figure 5.6: An algorithm to encode (hide) a payload into Flash memory
program time.
Then, the algorithm determines which value (0 or 1) needs to be written to
each bit location based on the message bit to be encoded. If a group is to store a
“1” value, we will program (write a 0) the bits in the group, and the group will
experience full program and erase stresses. If a group is to store a “0” value, the
bits in the group will be set to 1, and will see less stress.
With the payload mapped to bits in Flash memory, we perform the actual
write (program/erase) to Flash (Part B). We decide on a set number of stresses
N to exert on the Flash. N is chosen to ensure an acceptable bit error rate with-
out causing excessive stress. Each page is programmed N times in order to
imprint the payload into the Flash. In our experiments, we found that several
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hundred to a few thousand PE cycles are sufficient for SLC chips. An even
smaller amount of PE cycles are enough for MLC chips.
5.2.3 Recovery Algorithm
Figure 5.7 describes our algorithm to decode a payload hidden by our encod-
ing algorithm in Flash bit program time. Again, the algorithm is divided into
two parts: (A) physically reading the per-bit program time from Flash, and (B)
recomposing the payload from the program time distribution.
To read the hidden information, we must measure the program times for ev-
ery bit in the pages containing the hidden bits. To do so, we use the partial pro-
gramming algorithm described in the previous section. We choose M such that
at the end of M partial programs, more than half of the bits, are programmed.
The program time of a bit is expressed as the number of partial program cycles
needed to flip the bit from 1 to 0. For the bits that do not flip after the M partial
program operations, their program times are set to be a constant above M (i.e.
M + 1).
To reconstruct the payload from the per-bit program times, we apply two
thresholding steps. First, we compute the median program timeX across all bits
within each page. Then, the program time of each bit within a page is quantized
based on the median; if a bit’s program time is above half the median program
time (X/2), then its program time is set to 1; otherwise it is set to 0. (X/2) was
chosen empirically.
The bits are then divided into the groups specified by the hiding key. Within
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Algorithm II: Decoding
Part A – Reading the program time from Flash
1 For each selected block
2 Erase the block
3 Program every bit in the block to 0
4 Erase the block
5 For each selected page
6 For i = 1, 2, ...,M
7 Partial program the page to 0 (abort a program operation after time T )
8 Read the page
9 For each bit in the page
10 If the bit changed from 1 to 0
11 Set programtime for this bit to i
12 End if
13 End for
14 End for
15 For each bit
16 If the bit did not flip
17 Set its programtime to be M + 1
18 End if
19 End for
20 End for
21 Erase the block
22 End for
Part B – Extracting the payload message
1 For each selected block
2 For each selected page
3 Calculate the median X of the program times for all the bits
4 For each bit
5 If its programtime > (X/2)
6 Set programtime to 1
7 Else
8 Set programtime to 0
9 End if
10 End for
11 Generate the group for each message bit with the page hiding key
12 For each group
13 Calculate the average program time for the group
14 If the average is less than Th
15 Recover the message bit: 1
16 Else
17 Recover the message bit: 0
18 End if
19 End for
20 End for
21 End for
Figure 5.7: An algorithm to decode (recover) a payload from Flash mem-
ory program time.
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each group, the average of each individual bit’s program times (now consisting
of only 1 and 0) is computed, and the second thresholding step is performed.
Each bit in the payload is set to 1 if the average program time of the corre-
sponding group is below the threshold Th. Otherwise, the bit is set to 0.
In practice, with sufficient hiding PE cycles, we saw that there exists an ob-
vious gap between the average program times of the more-stressed and less-
stressed groups. As a result, it is straightforward to set the threshold Th to
distinguish the two types of groups. For each page, we first sort the average
program time of each group. Suppose the sequence of sorted program times is
X0, X1, X2, ..., XN . Then we calculate the intervals between the sorted average
program times and get X1 − X0, X2 − X1, .... Suppose the maximum interval
is XM − XL, then we set the threshold to be in the middle of that interval;
Th = (XM +XL)/2. In this way, we can get a per-page threshold. For the cases
with low hiding PE cycles, where there is no clear gap between the two clusters,
the threshold is set to be a constant across pages based on the histogram of the
average program times from multiple blocks.
For simplicity, we describe and evaluate the algorithm for the case where
all bits within a selected page are used to hide bits. In order to make detection
more difficult, it is also possible to only use a small subset of bits within a page.
We leave this variant for future work.
5.3 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the proposed scheme through experiments on Flash
chips. In addition to validating correct operation of the encoding and decoding
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Figure 5.8: Flash test board.
algorithms, we also study the robustness across various design parameters, per-
formance, detectability, recovery without the hiding key, and erase tolerance.
5.3.1 Evaluation Setup
Testbed Device
Our experiments use a custom Flash test board as shown in Figure 5.8. The
board is made entirely with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components with
a custom PCB. There is a socket to hold a Flash chip under test, an ARM mi-
croprocessor to issue commands and receive data from the Flash chip, and a
Maxim MAX-3233 chip to provide a serial (RS-232) interface. USB support is
integrated into the ARM microcontroller. We also wrote the code to test the de-
vice. The setup represents typical small embedded platforms such as USB Flash
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Manufacturer Part Number Size Qty Process
Hynix HY27UF084G2B 4 Gbit 1 5xnm class
SLC
Micron MT29F2G08ABA 2 Gbit 5 34nm
EAWP-IT:E4 SLC
Micron MT29F4G08ABA 4 Gbit 15 34nm
DAWP:D SLC
Micron MT29F16G08CB 16 Gbit 1 –
ACAWP:C MLC
Numonyx NAND04GW 4 Gbit 1 57nm
3B2DN6 SLC
Table 5.1: Tested Flash chips.
drives, sensor nodes, etc. This device shows that the techniques can be applied
to commercial off-the-shelf devices with no custom integrated circuits (ICs).
Flash Memory Chips
The experiments in this paper were performed with five types of Flash memory
chips from Numonyx, Micron, and Hynix. Table 5.1 shows their details. We
primarily performed experiments with Micron 4Gbit chips. Experiments using
other models will be marked.
In most experiments, we only used the first 4,096 bits of 16,896-bit pages
to avoid performance overheads given the limited amount of memory in the
microcontroller. We will refer to the first 4,096 bits as a “page” in the following
discussion. For the analyses of per-page read/program time and per-block erase
time, we used the entire page.
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Figure 5.9: Influence of hiding stress on BER.
5.3.2 Robustness - Bit Error Rate
In this subsection, we first study whether the proposed scheme can reliably hide
and recover bits in the program time characteristics. Here, we use the bit error
rate (BER) as the metric for measuring robustness. To measure the BER, we hid
a randomly generated message into Flash memory and compared the retrieved
message with the original.
In the baseline experiment, we used the first 4,096 bits of a page and divided
them into 32 groups (128 bits each) based on a randomly selected hiding key.
Then, we selected multiple pages and blocks across a Flash chip to form 5,120
groups, which represent 5,120 hidden bits, and stored bits using 5,000 program
and erase (PE) cycles in the encoding process. In this case, we got a bit error rate
(BER) of 0.0029 (0.29%).
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Figure 5.10: Influence of group size on BER.
Figure 5.9 shows the BER as a function of hiding stress, which is the number
of program/erase (PE) cycles used to stress each group in the hiding process.
The blue line shows the average BER using a single Micron 4Gbit chip. For each
data point in the figure, the BER is computed over 5,120 bits of hidden informa-
tion with the group size of 128 bits. For hiding stress levels of 2,500 and 5,000 PE
cycles, we also show the statistics across 15 Flash chips; the red triangles show
the average BER and the error bars show the maximum and minimum BERs
across the 15 chips. We can see that the BER decreases as the hiding stress in-
creases. More stress increases the program time difference between bits hiding
1s and 0s. However, the incremental benefit after 5,000 PE cycles is rather small.
Note that the typical lifetime of an SLC Flash chip from the datasheet is 100,000
PE cycles.
There is also a trade-off between the robustness of the scheme and its hid-
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Figure 5.11: Influence of page interval on BER.
ing capacity. When more physical bits are included in a group, the capacity
decreases. On the other hand, the statistical variations among groups will de-
crease as the group size increases. Therefore, the BER decreases with an increas-
ing group size, as shown in Figure 5.10. It is also observed that neighboring
pages have a strong influence on each other; stressing one page may also cause
some stress in a neighboring page. To solve this problem, only a subset of pages
with a specific interval K can be used within a block. If K is 4, then only page
0, page 4, page 8, and so on are used to hide information while the rest is not
used. The influence of this page interval on the BER is shown in Figure 5.11.
The experimental results suggest that there is not much benefit to using a group
size beyond 128 and a page interval beyond 4 for these chips. Figure 5.10 and
Figure 5.11 were generated from the 2Gbit Micron chips, but we found that the
group size of 128 and page interval of 4 also work well for the 4 Gbit chips.
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Figure 5.12: Influence of initial stress level on BER.
The effectiveness of the method on moderately used Flash chips is also stud-
ied. The influence of the initial stress level before the encoding process on the
BER is shown in Figure 5.12. Here, we aim to simulate the normal usage of the
Flash chip. So, in each program operation for the initial stress, random data are
programmed. For example, the BER at the initial stress level of 10 PE cycles
shows the error rate when bits are hidden after 10 PE cycles of programming
random data. It can be observed that as the initial stress level increases, the
BER also increases. However, a higher initial stress level can be tolerated by in-
creasing the stress level in the encoding process. Note that the error rate is still
manageable (less than 10-15%) even after hundreds of normal PE cycles.
The retention characteristics of the hiding scheme are shown in Table 5.2.
Note that since each decoding performs 2 PE cycles, these retention characteris-
tics include impacts from additional PE cycles in addition to the time between
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5,000 Hiding PE 10,000 Hiding PE
BER after zero retention 0.0029 0.0021
(1 post PE cycle)
BER after 2-day retention 0.0141 0.0035
(3 post PE cycles)
BER after 3-day retention 0.0187 0.0045
(5 post PE cycles)
BER after over a month 0.0178 0.0031
retention(7 post PE cycles)
Table 5.2: Retention characteristics of the hidden message.
information hiding and retrieval. In the first three rows of Table 5.2, the BER
increases as retention time and post-hiding PE cycles increase. In the last row,
the BER actually decreases a little compared to the third row. The results sug-
gest that the retention time has little effect on the BER. Intuitively, given that the
hiding scheme utilizes cell aging, this result is also supported by the fact that
a worn-out Flash memory does not recover greatly even after having been left
unattended for a long time.
5.3.3 Performance
In our experiments, when a whole page is used for hiding, it takes about 123.6
seconds to perform 5,000 PE cycles of hiding stress on a block, which embeds
2,048 bits of information in the block. The hiding throughput is around 16.6
bits/second. The upper limit of the throughput can also be calculated using
the page program time and block erase time given in the Flash memory chip
datasheet. The typical page program time is 200 microseconds and the typical
block erase time is 700 microseconds. With 2,048 hidden bits in 16 pages of a
block, the 5,000 PE cycles will take (0.2 ∗ 16 + 0.7) ∗ 5, 000/1, 000 = 19.5 seconds.
The throughput will be about 105 bits/second. This is the ideal case which
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does not include program data transfers and microcontroller overhead. The
hiding throughput will also be higher if we use a smaller number of PE cycles
for stressing, or if we use smaller groups.
In order to read the hidden information, one needs to obtain per-bit program
times using partial programming. The characterization speed depends on the
number of partial programs, M , used in the decoding algorithm. For reading
hidden bits (decoding), we only need to perform partial programs until more
than half of the bits flip. In our experiment, M for decoding is around 30, and
it takes around 3.63 seconds to characterize 16 pages, which contain 2,048 hid-
den bits. Therefore, the read throughput is about 564 bits/second. The read
throughput will be higher if the hiding scheme uses a smaller number of Flash
bits to encode each hidden bit.
For a detailed analysis to detect hidden bits (see 5.3.4), one needs to obtain
a complete program time distribution with a large M . In our testbed, it takes
612.6 seconds to characterize a block using M = 1, 200 even if we ignore data
transfer from the microcontroller to the host computer and processing time on
the host. A 4Gbit Flash memory chip has 4,096 blocks, so obtaining the complete
program time distribution of the whole chip will take around 29 days. Higher
capacity chips will take even more time to characterize for detection and decod-
ing. For comparison, simply reading the digital content from the 4Gbit Flash
chip will take approximately 4 minutes. Therefore, fully characterizing the en-
tire Flash chip without knowing where hidden information is located is quite
time consuming.
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5.3.4 Detectability
The previous subsection shows that the per-bit program time in Flash memory
can be controlled sufficiently to reliably store hidden information. Here, we
discuss whether an attacker with access to a Flash chip can detect the existence
of hidden information. In essence, the question is whether variations in Flash
memory characteristics due to information hiding can be distinguished from
variations due to normal use.
The proposed information hiding scheme uses per-bit program time, which
is not visible from the digital content in a Flash memory device. Also, the hid-
ing operation does not change normal Flash functions; users can still read, erase,
and write Flash memory in the expected manner. Therefore, the hidden infor-
mation cannot be detected from the inspection of digital content. Instead, an
attacker needs to rely on checking the analog properties of the Flash memory.
The following list summarizes the steps that an attacker needs to take in
order to analyze the analog properties, and in particular, the timing properties,
of Flash memory.
1. Check for anomalies in timing of normal Flash operations.
2. Pick pages/blocks for more detailed analysis.
3. Collect per-bit program time for a selected page.
4. Analyze the per-bit program time distribution of a page.
5. Repeat Steps 2 to 4.
In order to determine whether a Flash chip contains hidden information or
not, an attacker can start by checking the timing of normal Flash operations
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such as per-page program time and per-block erase time, which can easily be
obtained from normal operation. If these operations do not show any anomaly
– their timing is within the range of timing characteristics for normal use – then
the attacker needs to obtain and analyze per-bit program time by picking a page
for detailed analysis, collecting per-bit program times through partial programs,
and then running an analysis. If there is no way to identify suspicious pages
and blocks from normal operations, in the worst case, the attacker will need to
perform the detailed analysis for every single page in Flash memory, which will
take a long time.
In the rest of the subsection, we will discuss each step that the attacker needs
to take and whether the information that is hidden can be detected in each step.
Anomalies in Normal Flash Operations
Stressing a Flash chip may affect the analog characteristics of normal memory
operations such as page read time, page program time, and block erase time. If
these characteristics change significantly due to our scheme, an attacker could
use that to detect the existence of hidden information. Therefore, we first study
the impact of information hiding and normal Flash use on the page read time,
page program time, and the block erase time.
Using the Micron 4Gbit chips, we tested six hiding PE cycle counts (625,
1,250, 2,500, 5,000, 7,500, and 10,000) and five normal PE cycle counts (0, 32, 64,
128, 256) on 4 different chips. On each chip, we used 20 blocks, each containing
64 pages. Because we hide data once every fourth pages, only 16 pages within
each block are used to hide information. A normal PE cycle is performed by
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writing randomly generated data to every page in a block, then erasing that
block, simulating wear from normal usage.
To study the impact of information hiding on the page read time, we mea-
sured the time to read pages (after performing an erase) when they were fresh
as well as after 5,000 hiding PE cycles. The read times were virtually identical
before and after the hiding stress, showing that the read time would not be a
good indicator for the existence of hidden information.
Figure 5.13 shows the program times for individual pages in two blocks from
one chip, one fresh block and the other with hidden information. As shown in
the figure, even though our hiding algorithm only uses every fourth page in
a block, there is no visible pattern in per-page program time. The figure also
shows that the program time of a page shows distinct values. The distribution
between the distinct program times may change as a page wears out with PE
cycles. However, we found that the possible program time values for each chip
stay the same across the range of stress levels in both normal usage and infor-
mation hiding cases.
Figure 5.14 shows the program time distributions across four chips for three
different stress levels: fresh, 5,000 hiding PE cycles, and 32 normal PE cycles.
The figure again shows that the program time falls into a small set of distinct
values even though there are more distinct values across 4 chips. More impor-
tantly, pages with and without hidden information share the same set of pro-
gram time values. Also, unlike per-bit program time, the experimental results
show that the page program time does not change significantly with stress, at
least for the particular 4Gbit chips that we tested. This is likely due to the fact
that the page program time is determined by the control circuit based on the
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Figure 5.13: Program time for pages within a block.
slowest bit within a page. Therefore, each page’s program time by itself does
not show whether the page has hidden information or not.
Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16 illustrate the block erase time distribution within
a chip and across 4 chips, respectively. Similar to the program time, the erase
time also falls into a few distinct levels, which are common across different
stress levels. On the other hand, the figures show that the erase time tends
to increase as the stress level increases. As a result, blocks with hiding stress
are more likely to have a long erase time compared to fresh block without any
stress. In that sense, the erase time may be used to distinguish fresh pages from
blocks with hidden bits. However, because both normal PE cycles and hiding
PE cycles increase the erase time, it is unclear how to distinguish blocks with
hidden information from blocks with normal PE stress based on the erase time
distribution (see Figure 5.16). We also found that there exist fairly large chip-
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Figure 5.14: Program time histogram for three stress levels.
77
Figure 5.15: Erase time for 20 blocks within a chip.
to-chip variations. For example, some fresh chips may have over 50% of blocks
that show a long erase time even without any PE stress.
The experimental results so far show that there is no obvious pattern in pro-
gram time and erase time distributions to distinguish pages or blocks with hid-
den information from pages or block with normal PE stress. Yet, it may be
possible that there exists a pattern that is difficult to detect in human eyes. To
further study detectability of hidden information based on normal Flash oper-
ations timings, we tried a support vector machine (SVM) to predict whether a
page or a block has hidden information. A support vector machine is a machine
learning model that is widely used to recognize patterns and classify data sets.
We used libsvm, a popular SVM software package [37].
For the SVM experiments, we constructed multiple data sets using
pages/blocks with hidden information as well as pages/blocks with normal
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Figure 5.16: Erase time histogram for three stress levels (across 4 chips).
79
Figure 5.17: SVM accuracy for detecting hidden information (per-page
analysis).
stress, combining data from one hiding stress level and one normal stress level.
We used two hiding stress levels (2,500 and 5,000 PE cycles) and five normal
stress levels (0, 32, 64, 128, 256 PE cycles), collected from 4 Flash chips. Then,
for each data set, the SVM was trained with data from 3 chips and then tested
on data from one remaining chip. This construction represents an idealistic sce-
nario for an attacker. In practice, the attacker will need to consider all possible
stress levels for both normal uses as well as hiding, which will add more varia-
tions.
Figure 5.17 shows the prediction accuracy when the SVM is given the pro-
gram time and erase time for each page individually without a notion of blocks.
The SVM performs relatively well when distinguishing fresh pages and pages
with hiding stress. However, the accuracy drops significantly when comparing
pages with hiding stress and pages with moderate levels of normal PE stress.
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Figure 5.18: SVM accuracy for detecting hidden information (per-block
analysis).
In such cases, the accuracy is not much better than random guesses (50%). The
SVM performs better again for cases with high normal stress levels beyond 128
PE cycles because the normal stress exceeds the hiding stress level. In essence,
the results suggest that the SVM can distinguish pages with different stress lev-
els, but not pages with hiding stress and normal stress.
Figure 5.18 shows the accuracy of another SVM construction where the in-
put vectors were organized by block. In this design, each input is a vector of
program and erase time pairs for each page within a block, allowing the SVM
to see a pattern within a block instead of handling each page separately. The
goal of this SVM is to identify blocks with hidden information. The accuracy of
this SVM was similar to that of the per-page SVM. The SVM could distinguish
more stressed blocks from less stressed blocks, but not the hiding stress from
the normal stress.
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While not shown here, we also tested cases where data from all stress levels
were combined together to form a large data set. We found that dealing with
multiple stress levels significantly reduces SVM prediction accuracy for both the
page-granularity analysis and the block-granularity analysis. The SVM predic-
tions were no better than random guesses.
The experimental results so far show that it is difficult to distinguish
pages/blocks with hiding stress from pages/blocks with normal stress even on
one particular Flash model (Micron 4Gbit). In practice, an adversary will also
need to deal with diversity and variations among multiple Flash manufacturers
and models, which will make detecting hidden bits even more difficult.
In fact, we found that analog characteristics of Flash memory varies signifi-
cantly from model to model. For example, we tested 2Gbit Flash chips from Mi-
cron, which have an identical specification with the 4Gbit chips except for the
capacity. Surprisingly, the 2GBit chips, although only a generation apart from
the 4Gbit chips, showed a markedly different behavior compared to the 4Gbit
chips. For 2Gbit chips, the PE stress had little impact on block erase time while
noticeably changing page program time. In essence, the 2Gbit chips showed
the opposite type of behavior as the 4Gbit chips where the erase time shows a
significant shift. In both cases, we still found that it is difficult to distinguish the
impact of hiding stress from that of normal stress.
The significant variations across Flash models imply that an attacker will
need to build and train an SVM model for each Flash chip model in order to use
the SVM for determining the existence of hidden data on a particular chip. Ob-
viously, this would require a significant investment on the part of the attacker.
Even then, as we have shown above, there is no guarantee that an SVM model
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using normal Flash operations will be able to determine the existence of hidden
data with a high probability.
Page Selection and Per-Bit Program Time Collection
The study of normal Flash operations shows that an adversary cannot simply
determine whether a Flash chip has hidden information or not based on mea-
surements of normal Flash operation times. In essence, the hiding stress can-
not be effectively distinguished from normal PE stress. As a result, an attacker
needs to perform a more detailed analysis on per-bit program times in an at-
tempt to determine the existence of hidden data, which we will discuss next.
To perform the detailed analysis of each page, the attacker will have to char-
acterize each page. However, characterizing per-bit program time for every
page is quite a time-consuming process. As discussed in Section 5.3.3, a 4 Gbit
Flash memory chip requires around 29 days to characterize. For larger chips,
which are common today, the per-bit characterization will take even longer.
To avoid expensive characterization of every page, an attacker may be able
to use normal Flash operation times to select candidate pages for the detailed
analysis. For example, for the 4Gbit Micron chips, an attacker may consider
blocks with a higher erase time to be more likely to have hidden information.
However, the study in the previous subsection suggests that pages and blocks
with hiding stress can be hidden by stressing other blocks on the chip with a
moderate number of normal PE cycles.
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Figure 5.19: Partial program number distribution curve averaged over 5
blocks.
Per-Bit Program Time Analysis
A more detailed detectability analysis involves analyzing the partial program
time distribution for bits within a page. In normal usage, the bits are pro-
grammed 0s and 1s randomly over time. In the hiding scheme, some bits are
always programmed 0s and others are always programmed 1s. However, the
hiding scheme does not cause an obvious bimodal distribution due to large in-
trinsic variations of bits in a page. Figure 5.19 shows the partial program time
distribution averaged over 5 blocks. It can be seen that they are very similar to
each other.
To statistically analyze the distributions, we turned to support vector ma-
chines again. To train an SVM for the per-bit analysis, we prepared pages across
2 different hiding PE stress levels (2,500 and 5,000) and 8 different normal wear
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stress levels (32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1,024, 2,048, and 4,096 PE cycles). We used 5
blocks on each chip, 16 pages per block, for a total of 80 pages per chip, at each
stress level; i.e. on one chip, there are 80 pages with a hidden message stressed
at 2,500 hiding PE cycles, 80 pages with a hidden message stressed at 5,000 hid-
ing PE cycles, 80 pages without hidden data stressed 32 normal PE cycles, and
so on. We characterized pages across 15 different chips. Each page represents a
data point in the SVM. The SVM had access to the complete raw data for each
page: the vector representing a page and an entry for each bit, with the entry’s
value as the partial program time.
We then grouped the data from all chips into multiple sets, combining one
hiding stress level and one normal stress level. For example, one data set com-
prises the hidden data with 2,500 hiding PE cycles and the data with 128 normal
PE cycles, another data set used 5,000 PE hidden data and 4,096 normal PE cy-
cles, and so on, with a data set for each combination of hiding and normal PE
cycles.
For each data set we labeled the hidden pages and non-hidden pages appro-
priately, trained the SVM with data from chips 1-10, and then used the resulting
SVM to predict data from chips 11-15. Overall prediction accuracy of the SVM
on test data from chips 11-15 is shown in Figure 5.20 and Figure 5.21.
Each data set is represented by a point in Figure 5.20. Normal PE stress level
is shown on the X-axis. The data sets sharing 2,500 hiding PE stress are con-
nected by a solid line; the data sets sharing 5,000 hiding PE stress are connected
by a dashed line. Accuracy is shown on the Y-axis.
Overall accuracy is slightly better than random (50%) for all data sets, with
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Figure 5.20: SVM accuracy for detecting pages with hidden information
(using raw data).
Figure 5.21: SVM accuracy for detecting pages with hidden information
(using statistical moments).
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Figure 5.22: Receiver operating characteristic curve for data set including
2500 hiding PE and 128 normal PE stresses.
increased accuracy near the extremes of normal PE stress cycles. This matches
the expectation that a given page with a certain hiding PE stress level looks
similar to a page with a certain normal PE stress level. The further the normal
PE stress level varies from the matching hidden PE stress level, accuracy should
increase.
The data sets in Figure 5.21 show the SVM accuracy using a different rep-
resentation for page characteristics. Instead of using the partial program count
for every single bit in a page, a page was summarized by several statistical pa-
rameters: minimum, maximum, average, variance, skew, and kurtosis. We can
see that prediction accuracy is similar to the SVM using the raw bit-level data.
Figure 5.22 shows a more detailed analysis of the SVM accuracy using the
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Figure 5.23: BER as a function of the percentage of correct group members.
data set for 2,500 hiding and 128 normal stresses levels. The receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve plots the true positive rate versus the false positive
rate, and gives an indication of how accurate the SVM prediction is, for a given
false positive rate. The graph shows that the SVM prediction cannot achieve a
high true positive rate without incurring a large percentage of false positives.
We also note that detecting hidden information is likely to be even more
difficult in practice. For example, the hiding scheme may only use a subset of
a page instead of every bit. Also, a classifier such as an SVM will need to deal
with multiple stress levels together. We found that SVM accuracy is lower when
a data set contains multiple stress levels.
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5.3.5 Retrieval without the Hiding Key
Without the hiding key, one can still attempt to extract the hidden information.
By estimating (through random guessing if necessary) which bits are grouped
together, an attempt at extraction could reveal data if enough of the estimate is
correct. Figure 5.23 shows the bit error rate versus the percentage of correctly
guessed group bits.
With a large enough group and page size, it is difficult to correctly guess
enough of the group members. For our group size of 128, the probability that
10% (13) of the bits in a randomly selected group of 128 bits belong to the desired
group is approximately
(
128
13
)
∗ (1/32)13; or 0.5%. As there are 32 groups of 128
bits in a 4,096 bit page, each bit has a 1/32 chance of being in the desired group.
Even at 10%, the bit error rate is approximately 0.4. The chance of guessing 20%
of the bits in a randomly selected group drops precipitously; it is 7.3e-11%. In
addition, an attacker would have to try several group sizes.
Group size is a security parameter that one can adjust in order to provide
greater or lesser protection against brute force group selection.
5.3.6 Erase Tolerance
To test the erase tolerance of the scheme, we deliberately stress the chip after
hiding information on the chip. For this post-hiding stress, we program every
bit of the page to 0, in order to put the maximum stress on the bits. The influence
of post-hiding stress on the BER versus the number of PE cycles performed after
hiding information is shown in Figure 5.24. From the figure, we can see that
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Figure 5.24: Influence of post hiding PE cycles.
the BER increases as the post PE stress level increases. However, the BER of
hidden information is quite reasonable, even after hundreds of post PE cycles.
For example, with 5,000 hiding PE cycles, the BER is less than 10% even after
500 post-hiding stress cycles.
5.3.7 Different Flash Models
To ensure that our scheme applies more generally, we tested several different
Flash memory models (shown in Table 5.1). On all of the chips, we were able
to successfully hide and recover information. We noticed that chips from the
same manufacturer tend to perform similarly. For the Micron 2Gbit chips, 5
chips are tested using 10,000 hiding PE stress and 128-bit groups. The mean
BER for these five chips is 0.0030. The maximum BER and minimum BER are
0.0041 and 0.0016, respectively. Chips from different manufacturers perform
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differently. The tested Hynix chip has a similar BER, 0.0021, as the Micron chips
in the same experiment. However, for the Hynix chips, page 0 is different from
other pages in a block and, in the decoding process, a different threshold Th
is needed to convert the average program time into the final binary bit for this
page. The tested Numonyx chip has a very large gap for the group averages
with the correct hiding key, making its BER 0 in our experiment.
We also included a multi-level cell (MLC) chip in our testing, as these chips
are commonly used. MLC chips map multiple bits to each memory cell. As a
result, one needs to know the mapping of bits to Flash cells to selectively stress
certain cells. For the Micron MLC chip we tested, we only used the upper page
in a pair of pages (as specified from the datasheet). We programmed 0 to the
bits which we want to stress and 1 to the rest of the bits. Then, we programmed
all of the bits to 1. Interestingly, we found that bits within a page split into a fast
group and a slow group in this MLC chip, and only the faster programming bits
worked for information hiding. The MLC chip required significantly fewer PE
cycles to achieve the same level of BER compared to the SLC chips. For example,
we used 2,000 PE cycles for our experiments and got a BER of zero – there was
a large gap between the more stressed and less stressed groups.
5.4 Related Work
This section briefly summarizes prior work in steganography technologies and
hardware security functions, and discusses how they are related to the informa-
tion hiding technique in this paper.
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5.4.1 Steganography
With the advent of information technology, digital steganography has become
the subject of considerable study.
A large body of work has focused on hiding information within digital files,
such as images, videos, audio files, text, and others [38, 39, 40]. These schemes
usually hide data in unused meta-data fields, or by exploiting noise in the digital
content itself; i.e. altering colors slightly in an image or frequency components
in an audio file. In all cases the hidden data is tied to the data in the digital file. A
recent proposal [41] takes a different approach: using the fragmentation pattern
of digital files in a file system as a covert channel, avoiding tampering with the
digital content itself. However, hidden data is still innately tied to the existence
of a digital file. Also, modifying hard drive firmware has been investigated as
a potential way to hide information [42]. Data is hidden in sectors marked as
unusable at the firmware level (instead of the OS or filesystem level), which
renders the sectors inaccessible to most software and complicates recovery, as it
is difficult to tell legitimately bad sectors from ones used for hiding.
Our proposed scheme for Flash memory shares the concept of exploiting
noise to hide data, in the sense that intentionally created biases are hidden in
inherent variations in Flash program time. However, unlike the above meth-
ods, in which hidden information depends upon plainly visible digital files, our
information hiding scheme uses analog properties of Flash. As a result, hidden
information is decoupled from the digital content and instead tied to a physical
object. The use of physical properties makes detecting, copying, or erasing of
hidden information difficult because it requires detailed and time-consuming
analog measurements.
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Some steganographic techniques hide information where it is not encoded in
plainly visible digital files. For example, there exist methods to hide information
in the noise of wireless and optical transmissions by modifying the physical
layer protocol [43, 44, 45]. Our work presents a new way to hide information in
Flash memory. Unlike previous techniques, which often require special tools or
modifications to existing protocols, the proposed information hiding technique
can be applied to Flash memory chip through a standard interface without any
hardware modification.
To make the steganographic functions available in the embedded domain,
Stanescu et al. proposed to use an FPGA to efficiently process steganographic
algorithms [46]. Our technique gives embedded platforms the ability to hide
info within the device at a level not visible to the file system, and requires no
additional hardware, as Flash memory is common on embedded platforms.
5.4.2 Flash Based Security
We hide a message in the per-bit program times of Flash memory. Given the
popularity of Flash memory in computing systems, there have been studies on
analog characteristics of Flash memory [36]. While we have gained insight from
the previous work, it primarily focuses on using analog variations to build more
efficient computing systems rather than enhancing security.
Recently, there have been proposals to use noise and variations in Flash
memory for security by generating true random numbers and unique chip fin-
gerprints [5, 12]. We use the partial programming technique that was proposed
by the previous study. However, this paper proposes a completely new appli-
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cation of Flash memory in the context of information hiding instead of random
number generation and fingerprinting.
5.4.3 Physical Unclonable Functions
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) exploit process variation to provide
unique fingerprints for logic circuits [3]. Special circuits are built that vary their
output depending on the process variation specific to one instance of the chip.
This work is related to PUFs in the sense that we exploit physical properties
and process variations for security purposes. However, unlike PUFs, our in-
formation hiding scheme uses process variations to hide information instead of
generating device-specific fingerprints and keys. Also, our information hiding
technique can be applied using standard Flash chips and does not require any
custom circuitry.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In this work, we show that unmodified Flash chips are capable of providing
two important security functions: high-quality true random number genera-
tion and the provision of many digital fingerprints. Using thermal noise and
random telegraph noise, random numbers can be generated at up to 10Kbit
per second for each Flash bit and pass all NIST randomness tests. An authen-
tication scheme with fingerprints derived from partial programming of pages
on the Flash chip show high robustness and uniqueness. The authentication
scheme was tested over 24 pages with 24 different instances of a Flash chip
and showed clear separation. A Flash chip can provide many unique finger-
prints that remain distinguishable in various temperature and aged conditions.
Both random number generation and fingerprint generation require no hard-
ware change to commercial Flash chips. Because Flash chips are ubiquitous, the
proposed techniques have a potential to be widely deployed to many existing
electronic device though a firmware update or software change.
We also demonstrate a technique to hide information using the program time
of individual bits in Flash memory. Program time is an analog characteristic
of Flash and is not visible from digital content, does not affect normal mem-
ory operation, and survives Flash data erasure. Measuring program time can
be done over the standard Flash interface (with no hardware modification) via
partial programming. Using groups of bits to store one bit of payload allows
the technique to effectively hide information robustly with low bit error rates,
and makes detection difficult to prove unless one knows the hiding key. With-
out the key, measuring analog characteristics of the Flash chip reveals nothing
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that cannot be explained by normal wear or manufacturing variation. We note
that retaining a copy of the entire analog characteristics of the Flash memory
requires a large amount of time.
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